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Insider attacks are able to evade traditional security controls because the perpetrators of the 
attack often have legitimate access to protected systems and data. Massive logging of user online 
activity data (e.g. file access or transfer, use of data storage devices, email records) is collected 
and analyzed to detect insider attacks (e.g. data theft, fraud, policy violation, etc.). Such 
techniques are fraught with drawbacks and limitations: 1) the proverbial “needle in a haystack 
problem,” where very little useful information is found in massive data sets, especially where the 
incidence of malicious insider activities is very small compared to that of legitimate actors; 2) 
employee privacy issues may exist about the company monitoring employee behavior; and 3) 
these techniques are largely wanting in their accuracy, leading to notably high false positive 
rates. Perhaps the most salient limitation of these techniques is that the analyses are post-hoc, 
and by the time the activity is detected, the insider has already engaged in data theft or 
exfiltration, the impact of which may not be reversible. This paper discusses the concept of using 
probes for detection of threats, wherein user intentions to engage in insider attacks can be gauged 
by sending carefully designed probes that rouse malicious users into acting. In this research, we 
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seek a broad understanding of the scope and relevance of such probes. There are various 
motivations for users to steal data, including financial gain, patriotic fervor, and disgruntlement 
with work. In the present experiment, we created simulated conditions to reflect common insider 
motivations by providing subjects with imagined scenarios, then asking them to take the 
perspective of insiders in those scenarios, and explicate their actions through a series of 
structured questions that mimic our probes. The results show the effect of different scenarios in 
motivating the users, and the effectiveness of different probes in eliciting their actions.  
Key Words: insider threats, behavioral security, active probes, data theft 
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INTRODUCTION 
Data theft has become a key security issue for organizations with danger of information 
leakage from both external hackers and insiders. While, protection of information is a challenge 
in itself, protecting information from insider threats is more challenging than from external 
threats since insiders have privileges that they can exploit to steal and misuse confidential 
information. Information theft is not a new problem. While the general behavioral traits and base 
motivations for insider information disclosure remain unchanged over time, the means for data 
theft have evolved considerably. The proliferation of electronic and media storage options, 
increasing network connectivity and emerging communication technologies have all increased 
the potential of data theft; prior methods of controlling exfiltration of data with physical controls 
and surveillance are no longer adequate; for instance, the small footprint of storage devices can 
make it easy for infiltrators to evade physical detection. Bradley Manning was able to exfiltrate 
all the information he stole by putting it on a compact disk disguised as a music CD. The 
surveillance and security strategies of intelligence agencies are based on existing vectors of 
attack; however, with emerging technologies these vectors are changing.  
The motivation for data theft varies considerably; for instance motivation behind national 
espionage incidents is usually to steal military secrets for other countries and motivation for data 
theft from private firms is often personal gain. Attackers often rationalize their behavior as 
justified, perhaps to correct a perceived transgression (“the company is not treating me fairly”) or 
out of a sense of entitlement (“I contributed heavily to this project so should be able to retain 
ownership”). Such rationalizations explain how people who may see themselves as moral and 
honest can engage in minor acts of data exfiltration (cf., Mazar, Omir and Ariely, 2008). While 
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the individual acts are easy to self-justify, cumulatively, minor acts can result in significant 
damage to the firm. 
In the current literature on insider threat behavior, the most commonly cited motives are 
personal financial gain, disgruntlement, and a sense of entitlement (Moore et al., 2011). 
Employees may be able to sell information to competitors, hackers, or criminal groups, and those 
who have taken a job with another company may steal data right before their departure, in the 
hope that access to the data will provide them leverage for a favorable standing within the new 
organization. Many inside attackers seem to act out of feelings of resentment over perceived 
injustices by their employer, either in terms of inequitable distribution of rewards (i.e., 
distributive injustice) or unjust treatment (i.e., procedural injustice; Willison, 2009). To them, 
stealing company secrets may be perceived as a way of restoring equity and fairness.  Insider 
threats may also be motivated by feelings of social injustice, whereby workers seek to redress 
what they perceive as immoral acts on the part of their company. Finally, insider theft or attacks 
may also be motivated by employees’ feelings of proprietorship over data created through their 
own work.  
COUNTERING INSIDER MALICIOUS BEHAVIOR 
Detecting and countering insider behavior has traditionally been achieved through 
forensics data analysis.   Sensors are placed on the network and individual computers to collect 
data on user actions (e.g. file transfers, logins, USB usage), which are then analyzed for 
malicious behavior. Several forensic data analytic techniques have been used for insider 
behavior, such as Eldardiry et al. (2013), who propose a technique that uses sensor fusion 
techniques to analyze anomalies in user behavior. They flag anomalous patterns of behavior, 
such as when a user exhibits behavior that reflects activities of a group to which he/she does not 
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belong, or when the user’s behavior differs from that of peers in his/her own group. They use 
logging patterns, device and data access, email metadata, and search history in their data set and 
standard data mining techniques for the analysis. Legg et al. (2015) similarly use login, USB, 
email, web and file usage data to determine anomalies in the system; performing a series of 
analyses based on hourly and daily usage patterns. Shultz (2002) suggests a framework for 
insider behavior that utilizes regression/data mining on multiple data vectors including usage 
patterns, actions, meaningful errors (e.g. deleting log files), verbal behavior (e.g. hatred in 
emails, or hostility towards employer), and personality (e.g. introversion). A report from the 
defense company Raytheon on insider threats provides general guidelines for protection on a 
risk-based approach, including valuing assets, profiling individuals, investigating previous 
incidents, conducting surveillance on activities, and selectively analyzing data based on risk. In 
most of the research on insider threat based on data analytics, the data collected for analysis is 
very similar (i.e. file usage/access/transfer patterns, email meta data, search history etc.)  
The fundamental challenge with most of these data analytic systems is that they rely on 
data analysis post-incident. The detection may take weeks or even months, although typically 
mitigation requires quickly controlling the damage and attempting to fix the breach to prevent 
future occurrences. Passive post-hoc analysis is not sufficient; identifying individuals who pose 
risks a priori and preventing insider theft from happening is certainly a more desirable approach. 
Developing user behavioral profiles and linking them to insider theft risk is one viable method 
that has been suggested in the literature. Symantec (2011) reports suggest the use of behavior 
profiles of employees in estimating and countering insider threat risk. There has been some work 
in the context of human behavior and propensity for insider theft. Moore et al. (2011) analyzed 
48 insider theft incidents, concluding that individuals who fit into the category of an “ambitious 
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leader” or an “entitled independent” are more likely to engage in data theft behaviors. Nurse et 
al. (2014) provide a broad framework for insider behavior research. They suggest identifying 
personality correlates related to a propensity for insider behavior. Research using the big five 
personality traits--openness, extraversion, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and agreeableness--
has provided evidence that low conscientiousness and high neuroticism can predict an increased 
risk of malicious insider behavior (McCrae and Costa, 1990). Additionally, the dark triad of 
personality traits (Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy), as well as a lack of maturity, 
aggressiveness, poor social skills, personal integrity, and lack of self-esteem are also identified as 
traits that are likely to predict the greater likelihood of malicious insider behavior. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Insider behavior is also driven by such intrinsic factors as fear and greed. A basic premise 
of our research is that, within a particular context, employees fall to their basal instincts and get 
motivated to commit data theft; and then wait for an opportune moment to realize their goals.  
Data theft culminates through the confluence of the motive, capability, and opportunity 
triumvirate. We expect that capability to exfiltrate data exists already and if not motivated 
hackers will be able to acquire it easily. Thus the goal of our research is to develop live probes 
that can serve as decoys, and can be used to see if a user is inclined to engage in data theft prior 
to actually exfiltrating data. Probes are designed to signal opportunity and thus stimulate theft-
related activity. Employees who have a propensity to conduct insider theft will react to the 
probes and engage in data theft. If tools are put in place to measure insider behavior (e.g. file 
transfers and deletion, USB usage etc.) the probes will lead to identification of insider threats in 
the organization.  
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There are psychological attributes of humans that make them more vulnerable to insider 
behavior, and coincident with those psychological attributes, specific contextual situations that 
can motivate people to act as malicious insiders and steal data, such as: the downsizing of the 
company, a poor performance report, anger at the institution for unethical behavior or injustice, 
etc. Once users are motivated, they might seek an opportunity when they can steal data 
clandestinely without being observed, such as when computer systems are down. These 
motivations can be simulated by developing specific contexts that activate specific psychological 
traits of individuals.  
In this study, we attempt to gain a broad understanding of this link between user 
motivation and actions based on specific cues (probes). We create various situational contexts 
within which such behavior is particularly likely to happen, and then introduce probes, and test 
their efficacy in spurring the behavior. The situational contexts serve to provide individuals with 
a motivational context to engage in malicious insider behavior, whereas the probes are designed 
to provide an opportunity, or instigating factor, for them to engage in data theft. In our studies, 
psychological motivations will be created through contexts, and probes will be developed to 
elicit insider reaction. We develop scenarios to simulate different contextual situations, and ask 
subjects to role play an insider and explicate their actions based on specific probes that are 
introduced. Each scenario has a well defined context followed by specific questions that 
elucidate how a user will respond in a contextual situation and how he/she will respond to the 
probes.  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research was designed to develop probes that will identify an individual who is at 
risk for insider data theft. The probes in most cases establish a user’s propensity for data theft in 
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a naturalistic setting by measuring his/her actions in specific situations. We also assume that 
differences in an individual’s psychological attributes may play a role, such that the strategies 
and actions of insiders may vary based on these attributes. We devise several scenarios 
corresponding to typical employee motivations that drive insider behavior (as gleaned from the 
literature), and test the effectiveness of probes within each scenario.   
Probes were manipulated via messages delivered to participant/insiders in the scenario.  Five 
different email messages (probes) were created.  Sent in the form of email messages, the probes 
included:  
1. New security update coming in 3 days (signifying a brief window to act) 
2. Security system down for maintenance (brief window of opportunity) 
3. Random audit of computers announced (brief window to hide files or cover tracks) 
4. File permissions changing (brief window to hide files or cover tracks) 
5. Data vault/repository opened (opportunity to search for data) 
Different motives for insider threat exist, and thus it was important to test the probes in different 
contexts. Different motives for insider threat were gathered from the literature and then narrowed 
down to five motives. The scenarios were written to capture the five different contexts, reflecting 
different potential precursors (motivations) to insider theft:   
1. Financial Gain (new job offer) 
2. Social Justice (anger at the organization for their policies and actions toward others) 
3. Disgruntlement (perceived personal injustice; quit and find new job) 
4. Patriotism/Loyalty (ex-patriate approached to steal data to advance a country’s agenda)  
5. Morality spy (ex-patriate upset by government’s actions asked to exposing state secrets to 
representatives of foreign states) 
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In total, five scenarios and five probes were developed for the analysis, and surveys were created 
that will test each of the probes within each context. In the study, participants were asked to read 
the vignettes and to indicate how they think an insider will respond to specific probes in different 
contexts.  
Each context was paired with each probe, creating a total of 25 scenarios representing 
unique context-probe combinations. It was not feasible or practical to recruit volunteers to 
complete all 25 scenarios in a within-subjects design. Nor was it feasible given our initial sample 
design a full factorial between-subjects design. Instead, we started by providing each subject 
with 3 scenarios representing unique context-probe combinations.  
The scenarios in the surveys were divided into two parts. The first part of the scenario described 
the context: a description was given of a fictitious worker in a particular context who is 
considering engaging in insider theft.   For example, in the financial gain context, the worker is 
considering a job offer with a competitor, and to make his position stronger with his new 
employer he could take information on his current projects with him.  
This section was followed by a series of questions asking about the likelihood of the 
worker engaging in seven different insider threat behaviors (i.e. taking notes on his research, 
talking to other researchers about their projects, looking for data on servers and data repositories, 
attempting to log into other computers to find important data; searching for files on servers and 
computers, taking pictures of product designs with a camera, downloading files to a personal 
USB).  In the second part of the scenario, the fictitious employee is described as having decided 
to exfiltrate data, and then he/she receives an email message containing one of the five probes 
listed above.  After reading the email message, participants were asked to rate the likelihood that 
the fictitious employee would engage in six threat-like behaviors (act immediately to secure data, 




Proceedings of the 11
th
 Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Dublin, Ireland, December 16, 2016.       10  
 
search for files on servers or computers, attempt to log into different computers to find data, 
download data and files to a personal USB drive, use a camera to take pictures of product 
designs, and remove/delete files not related to one’s own assigned projects).  Each likelihood 
question was rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Extremely Unlikely to 5 = 
Extremely Likely.  
We collected data from cyber security experts at two security-related conferences: NYS 
Cyber Security Conference, and the Americas Conference on Information Systems. By including 
security experts, our goal was to ensure that the subjects would understand the concepts of 
insider data theft, as well as the ways that data can be exfiltrated. Online surveys were sent to 
employees of NYS Information Technology Services. Based on the feedback we received from 
the conferences, it was decided to reduce the number of scenarios from 3 to 2 for the online data 
collection, to reduce the burden on any individual subject. Our data collection strategy was not 
optimal from a design perspective, in that participants were exposed to only a small set of the 
possible experimental conditions. However, our goal was to gather an initial set of preliminary 
data on the effects of the probes and contexts, which will guide our subsequent, more rigorous 
experiments. In total, about 171 ratings from 64 participants were received and analyzed for this 
preliminary study.  
INITIAL RESULTS 
Because of the non-independence of data in our preliminary sample, we refrained from 
inferential tests and focus on descriptive statistics.  Also, because the sample sizes within each of 
the 25 scenario x probe conditions were small, we focus on main effects of probes (across 
scenarios) and scenarios. This is appropriate because an effective probe should elicit the same 
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threat behavior regardless of the motive of the actor. We are collecting data in a follow-up study 
that will allow for more thorough inferential analyses.   
Table 1 presents the perceived likelihood of insider threat behavior within the different 
contexts. These results reveal that the social justice and disgruntled worker scenarios generated, 
on average, the highest likelihood of threat behavior. These groups of workers were particularly 
more likely than workers in the other scenarios to take detailed notes on products, look for data 
on servers and computers, and attempt to log into computers.  The mean likelihood rating across 
the six behaviors was 3.44 for the social justice scenario, and 3.37 for the disgruntled worker 
scenario, indicating a fairly high likelihood of threat behavior under these scenarios.  This 
suggests that social justice and disgruntlement may be important motives for data exfiltration.  
The next two strongest contexts for data exfiltration were patriotism and new job/financial gain 
scenarios, with average ratings across the 7 behaviors of 3.19 and 3.00, respectively.  The 
morality/spy scenario yielded the lowest likelihood ratings.  The most likely behaviors across all 
contexts were taking detailed notes (M = 3.74), and talking to other researchers about their work 
(M = 3.72).  Interestingly, these behaviors would be conducted “off-line” and would operate 
outside the realm of the technological and performance monitoring tools companies might use to 
combat insider threats.  Logging onto and searching for files on computers and servers were seen 
as less likely behaviors (M = 2.40; M = 2.91).  The first part of the scenarios depicted what could 
be considered the ‘initial phase’ of data exfiltration, wherein the insider may be more concerned 
with planning than actually searching for data. 
Table 1: Mean Likelihood Ratings (and Standard Deviations) of Inside Behavior in Different 
Contexts (S1: New Job Opportunity; S2: Social Justice (Water); S3: Disgruntled Employee 
(Quit); S4: Disgruntled Employee (Spy);  S5: Patriot)  
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Actions 
Scenarios / Contexts 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Take detailed notes on his research so 












Talk to other researchers about their 











Look for ways to gather data from 











Attempt to log into different computers 











Search for files related to company 























Download research and product files to 












Table 2 presents the mean likelihood ratings for the second part of the scenarios, and tests the 
effects of the probes.  In general, the probes provoked their intended reactions: probes designed 
to signal an opportunity to exfiltrate data resulted in a higher likelihood of exfiltration behaviors.  
The probe indicating the presence of a data repository resulted in the highest likelihood ratings 
(M = 3.32), suggesting that respondents saw this as a good opportunity for the insider to search 
for, and download data.  The probe announcing a forthcoming security software update, and 
hence the closing of a window of opportunity, resulted in similar average likelihood ratings 
(M=3.28), suggesting that respondents felt the insider would experience a sense of urgency to 
respond before the window of opportunity closed.  The probes announcing audits resulted in 
lower ratings for exfiltration behavior, but higher likelihood of removing files unrelate current 
projects from one’s computer.  The threat of an audit was perhaps seen as a signal to hide 
evidence of exfiltration. Interestingly, the probe announcing a brief shutdown of the security 
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software did not promote exfiltration behaviors to the same extent as the probes announcing a 
new security update and new data repository.   
Table 2: Mean likelihood ratings and standard deviations for the impact of probes (email 
messages) on user actions (P1: Security Update; P2: Weekend Software Upgrade; P3: Training; 
P4: Security Audit; P5: Backup Server Data)  
Actions 
Probes 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
 























Attempt to log into different computers 











Download research and product files to 























Remove or delete files for his computer 














These results suggest that using active probes to stimulate users to act may improve the 
chances of identifying insider threats. Waiting for naturally occurring events that may trigger a 
malicious insider to act is both risky and resource intensive, since actual data would be at risk 
and monitoring will need to be conducted continuously. Our scenario analysis gives us an initial 
indication that active probes can work for identifying malicious insiders, since our scenarios 
elicited good response from the subjects. There are differences in response rates based on the 
specific context, and based on the different probes. This allows us to narrow down the probes for 
further experimental work, where user responses can be tested in simulated settings. We also 
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